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Abstract. At present, there exist several automatic tools that, given a
software, ﬁnd locations of possible defects. A general tool does not take
into account a speciﬁcity of a given program. As a result, while many
defects discovered by this tool can be truly harmful, many uncovered
alleged defects are, for this particular software, reasonably (or even fully)
harmless. A natural reaction is to repair all the alleged defects, but the
problem is that every time we correct a program, we risk introducing
new faults. From this viewpoint, it is desirable to be able to gauge the
repair risk. This will help use decide which part of the repaired code is
most likely to fail and thus, needs the most testing, and even whether
repairing a probably harmless defect is worth an eﬀort at all – if as
a result, we increase the probability of a program malfunction. In this
paper, we analyze how repair risk can be gauged.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Traditional approach to software testing. The main objective of software
is to compute the desired results for all possible inputs. From this viewpoint, a
reasonable way to test the software is:
– to run it on several inputs for which we know the desired answer, and
– to compare the results produced by this software with the desired values.
This was indeed the original approach to software testing.
It turned out that experts can detect some software defects without
running the program. Once it turns out that on some inputs, the program
is not producing the desired result, the next step is to ﬁnd – and correct – the
defect that leads to the wrong answer.
After going through this procedure many times, programmers started seeing
common patterns in the original defect locations. For example, a reasonably
typical mistake is forgetting to initiate the value of the variable. In this case,
we may get diﬀerent results depending on what happens to be the initial value
stored in the part of the computer memory which is allocated for this variable.

This defect is even more dangerous if the variable is a pointer, i.e., crudely
speaking, if it stores not the actual value of the corresponding object, but rather
the memory address at which the actual value is stored. In this case, if we do not
initialize the pointer, not only can we access the wrong value, but we may also
end up with a non-existing address or an address outside the memory segment
in which your program is allowed to operate – at which point the program stops,
since it either does not know what value to pick or is not allowed to pick up the
corresponding value (this is known as segmentation fault).
In many programming language that do not automatically check the array
indices, another typical defect is asking for a value a[i] of an array a for an index
i which is outside the array’s range. In this case, the compiler obediently ﬁnds
the corresponding space in the memory, not realizing that it has beyond the
place of the original array – this can overwrite important information; this is
known as buﬀer overrun.
Static analysis tools. Once programmers realized that there are certain patterns of code typical for software defects, they started to come up with automatic
tools for detecting such patterns and thus, warning the user of possible defects
of diﬀerent potential severity.
At present, there are many such tools – Coverity [1], Fortify, Lint, etc. – and
most of these tools are eﬃciently used in practice; see, e.g., [3].
Some “defects” found by static analysis tools do not harm the program’s functionality. For the purpose of this paper, it is important to mention
that not all “defects” uncovered by a static analysis tool are actually hurting
the program.
For example, some programs have extra variables, i.e., variables which are
never used. This happens if a programmer originally planned to use the variable, started coding with it, then changed her mind but forgot to delete all the
occurrences of this variable. Static analysis tools mark it as a possible detect,
since in some situations, it is indeed an indication that some important value is
never used. However, in many other cases, it may be syntactically clumsy, but
does not cause any problem for the program.
Another defect that may not necessarily be harmful is the logically dead code,
when a branch in a branching code is never visited. For example, if as part of
the computations, we compute a square root of some quantity, it makes sense
to make sure that this quantity is non-negative. When this quantity appears
as result of long computations, it may happen that, due to rounding errors, a
small non-negative value becomes small negative. In this case, it makes sense,
if the value is negative, to replace this with 0. However, if we write a code this
way, but we only use to compute the square root of an input which is always
non-negative (e.g., of the weight), then the branch corresponding to a negative
value is never used. In some cases, this may be a real defect, indicating that we
may have missed something that would lead to the possibility of this condition.
However, in cases like described above, this “defect” is mostly harmless.
Yes another example of a possible defect is indentation. In some programming
languages like Python, indentation is used to indicate the end of the condition or

the end of the loop. However, in most other programming languages, indentation
is ignored by the compiler, it simply helps people better understand each other’s
code. A static analysis tool will indicate the discrepancy between the indentation
and the actual end of the condition or of a loop as a defect – and it indeed may
be a defect. However, in many cases, it is just a sloppiness of a programmer that
does not aﬀect the program’s execution.
Correcting non-harmful defects may cause real problems. Once a static
analysis tool marks a piece of code as containing a possible defect, a natural
reaction is to repair this part of the code.
The problem is that, every time you change even a few lines of software,
this may introduce additional faults – and this time, serious ones. The only
way to avoid this problem is to thoroughly test the changed software. However,
an extensive testing – that would, in principle, reveal all new faults – is very
expensive. As a result, many of these changes have to be performed without
complete testing, thus introducing many possible points of failures at every place
where the code was changed.
We need to gauge repair risk. To make the repair eﬀort cost-eﬃcient, it
would be useful to know which defect repair have the highest risk of causing a
problem after the ﬁx. This way, we can focus our testing eﬀort on these defects,
save money by performing only limited testing of low-risk repairs.
And if an alleged defect is usually harmless but its repair may cause trouble,
maybe a better strategy would be to keep this alleged defect in place. This
is specially true for legacy software, software that was developed before static
analysis tools became ubiquitous. If we apply such a tool to this software, we may
ﬁnd lots of alleged defects, but since the program has been running successfully
for many years, it is highly probable that most of these alleged defects are
actually harmless.
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we describe how repair risk can be
gauged.
In our analysis, we use two diﬀerent approaches: a probabilistic approach
and a fuzzy-based approach. Interestingly, both approaches lead to the same
expression for the repair risk, which makes us conﬁdent that this is indeed the
correct expression for the repair risk.

2

Analysis of the Problem: Which Factors Determine the
Risk

First factor: how big are the changes. Every time we change a line of code,
we increase a risk. The more lines of code we change, the more we increase the
risk.
Thus, one of the factors aﬀecting the risk is the number L of lines of code
that has been changed.

Second factor: how frequently are the changed lines used. Simple errors,
when a piece of code always produced wrong results, are usually mostly ﬁltered
out by simple testing.
As a result, a faulty piece of code usually leads to correct results, but sometimes, for some combination of inputs, produces an erroneous value.
If we run this piece of code once, the chances that we accidentally hit the
wrong inputs are small, so most probably, this will not lead to any serious problem. However, if this piece of code appears inside a loop, then for each program
run, this piece of code runs many times with diﬀerent inputs. As a result, it
becomes more and more possible that in one of these inputs, we will get a wrong
result – and thus, that the overall software will fail.
Thus, the second factor that we need to take into account is the number of
iterations I that this particular piece of code is repeated in the program.
For example, if this piece of code is inside a for-loop that repeats 1000 times,
then I = 1000. If this piece of code is inside a double for-loop – i.e., a for-loop
for which each of its 1000 iterations is itself a for-loop with 1000 iterations (as
often happens with matrix operations), we get I = 1000 × 1000 = 106 .
What we want. We want to be able to gauge the repair risk based on these
two parameters: L and U .
Two types of software errors. As we have mentioned, there are, in eﬀect,
two types of software errors:
– rarer fatal error that practically always lead to a wrong result or, more
generally, to a program malfunction; and
– more frequent subtle error which are usually harmless, but can cause trouble
for a certain (reasonably rare) combination of inputs.
In our analysis, we need to take into account both types of software errors.

3

How to Gauge Repair Risk: Probabilistic Approach

Taking fatal errors into account. Let pf denote the probability that a line
of code contains a fatal error. Then, the probability that a line of code does not
contain a fatal error is equal to 1 − pf .
Software errors in diﬀerent lines are reasonably independent. Thus, the probability that an L-line new piece of code does not contain a fatal error can be
computed as a product of L probabilities corresponding to each of the lines, i.e.,
as (1 − pf )L .
Taking subtle errors into account. Let ps denote the probability that one
run of a line will lead to a fault. So, the probability that a line performs correctly
during one run is equal to 1 − ps .
Faults on diﬀerent lines are, as we have mentioned, reasonably independent.
Also, inputs corresponding to diﬀerent iterations are reasonably independent.
When we run an L-line piece of new code I times, this means that we perform

a running-of-one-line process I · L times. Thus, the probability that all lines
will run correctly on all iterations is equal to the product of I · L individual
probabilities, i.e., to the value (1 − ps )I·L .
Taking both errors into account. Fatal and subtle errors are reasonably independent; e.g., as we have mentioned, discovering a fatal error does not prevent
the software from having subtle error.
We know that the probability that fatal errors will not aﬀect the result is
equal to (1 − pf )L . We also know that the probability that subtle errors will not
aﬀect the result is equal to (1−ps )I·L . Thus, due to independence, the probability
that the new piece of code will perform correctly, i.e., that neither of the two
types of errors will surface, is equal to the product of these two probabilities,
i.e., to the value
P = (1 − pf )L · (1 − ps )I·L .
91)
Resulting criteria for repair risk. Ideally, we would like to know the probability of the program’s fault. However, this requires that we know two parameters
pf and ps , which may be diﬃcult to get.
In the ﬁrst approximation, it would be suﬃcient to simply order diﬀerent
repaired piece of code by risk – so that, in realistic situations with limited resources, we should concentrate all the testing on the pieces with the highest
repair risk – and among probably harmless alleged defects, only repair those
whose repair risk is the lowest.
From the viewpoint of such comparison, comparing the probabilities is equivalent to comparing their logarithms
log(P ) = L · log(1 − pf ) + I · L · log(1 − ps ).
This is, in turn, equivalent to comparing the ratios
log(P )
= I · L + c · L = L · (I + c),
log(1 − ps )
where we denoted
def

c =

log(1 − pf )
.
log(1 − ps )

So, we arrive at the following conclusion.
Probabilistic case: conclusion. To gauge the risk of repairing an alleged
defect, we need to know:
– the number of lines L changed in the process of this repair, and
– the number of times I that this piece of code is repeated during one run of
the software.
The relative repair risk is represented by the product
L · (I + c),

(2)

for some constant c.
Comment. Note that, in contrast to the expression for probability, which required
two parameters, this expression requires only one parameter – and one parameter
is easier to experimentally determine than two.

4

How to Gauge Repair Risk: Fuzzy Approach

Need to go beyond the traditional probabilistic approach. To follow
through with the probabilistic approach, we needed to make an assumption that
faults corresponding to diﬀerent lines and/or diﬀerent iterations are completely
independent. While in the ﬁrst approximation, this assumption may sound reasonable, it is clear that in reality, this assumption is only approximately true:
programmers know that a fault in one line often causes faults in the neighboring
lines as well.
This can happen if the same mistake appears in diﬀerent lines due to the
same programmer’s misunderstanding, or due to the fact that the second line
may be obtained from the ﬁrst one by editing – and so, an undetected error in
the ﬁrst line is simply copied into the second one.
Ideally, in addition to probabilities of one line being correct, we should also
consider:
– a separate probability of two lines being correct – which is, in general, different from the square of the ﬁrst probability,
– a separate probability that three lines are being correct, etc.
However, as we have mentioned earlier, even obtained two probabilities is
diﬃcult. Obtaining many others – corresponding to diﬀerent numbers of lines
and diﬀerent numbers of iterations – would be practically impossible. What can
we do?
Solution: fuzzy approach. Lotﬁ Zadeh faced a similar problem when he decided to analyze expert knowledge. Expert knowledge contains many imprecise
(“fuzzy”) rules that uses imprecise words from natural language like “small”.
For each such word, and for each value x of the corresponding quantity, we
can ask the expert to gauge to what extent the given value satisﬁes the given
property: e.g, to what extent the value x is small. We can call the resulting
estimate the degree of belief, the degree of conﬁdence, we can call it a subjective
probability – the name does not change anything.
The problem appears if we take into account that the condition of an expert
rule contains usually not just one simple statement like “x is small”, but an
“and”-combination of several such statements. For example, a typical expert
rule for driving a car would say something like “if we are going fast and the car
in front decelerates a little bit, and the road is reasonably slippery, then we need
to break gently”.
To utilize this rule, we need to ﬁnd the subjective probability (degree of
conﬁdence) that for a given velocity v, for a given distance d to the car in front,
etc. the corresponding “and”-condition is satisﬁed.

How can we ﬁnd this condition? Ideally, we should elicit this subjective probability from the expert for each possible combination of the inputs (v, d, . . .)
However, for a large number of parameters, the number of such combinations
becomes astronomical, and there is no way to ask an expertthe resulting millions
and billions of questions.
What Zadeh proposed – and what is one of the main ideas behind what he
called fuzzy logic (see, e.g., [2, 5, 4, 7–9]) is that, since we cannot elicit all degree
of belief in “and”-statement A & B from the experts, we thus need to come up
with an algorithm f& (a, b) that would:
– given degree of belief a in the statement A and b in the statement B,
– return an estimate f& (a, b) for the expert’s degree of conﬁdence in the “and”statement A & B.
This algorithm should satisfy some reasonable properties. For example, since
A & B means the same as B & A, it is reasonable to require that f& (a, b) =
f& (b, a), i.e., in mathematical terms, that the operation f& (a, b) is commutative.
Similarly, since A & (B & C) means the same as (A & B) & C, it is reasonable
to require that f& (a, f& (b, c)) = f& (f& (a, b), c), i.e., that the operation f& (a, b)
is associative. An “and”-operation f& (a, b) that satisﬁes these and other similar
properties is known as a t-norm.
There are many possible t-norms. One of them is the product f& (a, b) = a · b,
that corresponds to the case when all the events are independent. However, there
are many other t-norms – that correspond to possible dependence.
Let us apply this approach to our problem. In this approach, we no longer
assume independence. To compute the subjective probability (degree of conﬁdence) in an “and”–combination o diﬀerent events, instead of a product, we can
use an appropriate t-norm.f& (a, b). Thus, instead of the formula (1), we get a
more complex formula
P = f& (1 − pf , . . . , 1 − pf (L times), 1 − ps , . . . , 1 − ps (I · L times)).

(3)

It is known (see, e.g., [6])) that every t-norm can be approximated, with
arbitrary accuracy, by t-norms of the type f& (a, b) = h−1 (h(a) · h(b)), for some
strictly increasing function h(x), where h−1 (x) denotes an inverse function, for
which h−1 (h(x)) = x. So, for all practical purposes, we can safely assume that
our t-norm is exactly of this type.
For such t-norms, f& (a, b, . . . , c) = h−1 (h(a)·h(b)·. . . h(c)). Thus, the formula
(3) takes the form
(
)
P = h−1 (h(1 − pf ))L · (h(1 − ps ))I·L .
(4)
Comparing such values is equivalent comparing the values
h(P ) = (h(1 − pf ))L · (h(1 − ps ))I·L ,
or, equivalently, the value
log(h(P )) = L · log(h(1 − pf )) + I · L · log(h(1 − ps )),

or the value

log(h(P ))
= I · L + c · L = L · (I + c),
log(h(1 − ps ))

where
def

c =

log(h(1 − pf ))
.
log(h(1 − ps ))

Conclusion. The fact that in this more general not-necessarily-independent
case, we get the same expression L · (I + c) for repair risk makes us conﬁdent
that this is indeed the correct expression.
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